Real Property - Grantor\u27s Covenant to Insert Restrictions in Future Deeds as Personal Covenant by Huck, John B.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 53 Issue 4 
1955 
Real Property - Grantor's Covenant to Insert Restrictions in Future 
Deeds as Personal Covenant 
John B. Huck 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John B. Huck, Real Property - Grantor's Covenant to Insert Restrictions in Future Deeds as Personal 
Covenant, 53 MICH. L. REV. 636 (1955). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol53/iss4/18 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
636 MrcmGAN LA.w R.Evmw [ Vol. 53 
REAL PnoPERTY-GRANToR's COVENANT To lNsERT REsTRICTIONS IN FuTURE 
DBEDs As PERSONAL COVENANT-Certain farm owners, intending to subdivide 
the land, conveyed a lot to plaintiff by a deed restricting its use to residence 
purposes and providing that only single dwellings could be erected. The grantors 
covenanted to insert the same restrictions in future deeds to the rest of the 
land. Plaintiff recorded his deed. The grantors subsequently sold another lot 
to defendant church without inserting a similar restrictive covenant. Plaintiff 
brought suit to enjoin the erection of the church. On appeal from a decree for 
defendant, held, affirmed, three judges dissenting. The parties to the first deed, 
in providing for similar covenants in future deeds from the same grantor, did 
not impose upon the land retained by the grantors, while owned by them, the 
same restrictions as were imposed on the land granted; therefore, under the 
theory of reciprocal negative easements, the restrictions could not subsequently 
be imposed on the land when sold to the defendants. The language indicated 
that the grantors' covenant to insert similar restrictions in future deeds was 
intended to be merely a personal covenant. Buckley v. Mooney, 339 Mich. 398, 
63 N.W. (2d) 655 (1954). 
A conveys part of his land to B, the deed contains mutual restrictive coven-
ants, and the deed is properly recorded. A later conveys all or a part of his 
remaining land to C. In Michigan, as in some other states, C is charged with 
notice of the restrictions imposed upon the land by the prior deed.1 This rule 
foreclosed any claim by the defendant in the principal case that it was a pur-
chaser without notice of the encumbrance. The defendant did, however, per-
suade the court that the covenant was a personal one as against the grantors, 
and that he, the defendant, consequently was not bound to observe the restriction 
even though having notice of it. Although not clearly stated in the opinion of 
the court, there are two possible bases for the court's conclusion that the grantors' 
covenant was personal: (I) it would be personal if it did not "touch and concern" 
I McQuade v. Wilcox, 215 Mich. 302, 183 N.W. 771 (1921). Accord, Finley v. 
Glenn, 303 Pa. 131, 154 A. 299 (1931). See also 16 A.L.R. 1013 (1922); 2 TIFFANY, 
RBAL PnoPBRTY, 2d ed., pp. 2188-2190 (1920). Contra, Glorieux v. Lighthipe, 88 N.J.L. 
199, 96 A. 94 (1915). The McQuade case, as authority for imposing reciprocal negative 
easements, was distinguished on the basis that the restrictions there were expressly stated 
as being for the benefit of all present and future owners. A subsequent grantee in Michigan 
is also charged with notice of any restrictions disclosed by an examination of the character 
of the neighborhood. Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925). 
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the land; (2) it would also be personal, even if it did touch and concern the 
land, if the parties did not intend that the burden and benefit attach to their 
respective lots.2 There is little question but that the covenant in the principal 
case touches and concerns the land. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that 
the court, in construing the covenant as peF5onal, gave effect to the reasonable 
intentions and expectations of the parties to the earlier deed. Such a personal 
covenant would be fully executed if A, the grantor in the earlier deed, inserted 
the required restriction in his deed of conveyance to C, the grantee of A's 
remaining land. C would not be bound to impose the same restrictions upon 
a grantee to whom he, in turn, might convey the land; nor would B have a 
cause of action against C's grantee even though the latter might be said to take 
with notice of the restrictions imposed by the earlier deeds. It would seem 
rather that the parties intended that the burdens and benefits attach to their 
respective lands in order that the retained land be restricted at the time of the 
sale to defendant whether or not the restrictions were put in his deed.8 Thus 
construed, the plaintiff could enjoin any future grantee with notice from violat-
ing the restrictions, even though the plaintiff suffered no damage from the 
violation.4 The fact that the parties did not impose the restrictions on the 
retained land while owned by the grantors is not inconsistent with an intention 
to subject this land to the restrictions when conveyed to subsequent grantees.6 
The court, having summarily concluded that the covenant of the grantor was 
personal, limited its decision to the difficult issue of implied reciprocal :negative 
easements.6 Had the covenant been construed as real, the case could have been 
solved under the broader principles of equitable servitudes in general. Thus 
the defendant in the principal case would be charged with notice of the express 
covenant and restrictions, and the case would have been decided for the plaintiff 
under the equitable principle that the burden of an owner's covenant will be 
binding in equity on a purchaser who takes the estate with notice.7 · In most 
cases applying this rule, a landowner enforced a covenant made by his grantee 
B against a sub-grantee of B who took with notice.8 In the few cases having 
facts parallel to those of the principal case, however, no distinction has been 
2 See 2 AMmuCAN LAw OF PROPERTY §9.10 (1952). 
8 Cf. University Club of Chicago v. Deakin, 265 lli. 257, 106 N.E. 790 (1914). 
4 Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546 (1876). See Clark, "Equitable Servitudes," 16 
MICH. L. REv. 90 at 96 (1917). 
6 The dissenting opinion construed the covenant as indicating that the intention of the 
parties was that the restrictions were to be immediately applicable to the land while still 
retained by the grantors. 
6 Counsel for plaintiff prejudiced their case by limiting the brief to this issue. 
7Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848). See note 1 supra. 
s Whitney v. Union Ry. Co., 77 Mass. 359 (1858); Trustees of Columbia College 
v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440 (1877). See 2 PoMERoY, EQUITY JurusPRUDBNCB, 2d ed., §688 
(1892). See also Lewis v. Gollner, 129 N.Y. 227, 29 N.E. 81 (1891), where the equity 
of the covenantee attached to after-acquired property of the covenantor. 
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drawn on this ground. 9 Where the question has been raised the court has 
stated that the rule applies equally in the two situations.10 
The doctrine of implied reciprocal negative easements performs the function 
of imposing on one lot, the chain of title to which does not disclose any restric-
tions, the same restrictions as have been imposed on neighboring lots pursuant 
to a general scheme. In the principal case the grantor's covenant was an 
express one and was within the defendant's chain of title. Thus, it should 
have been easier to find an enforceable restriction in this case than in the type 
of case involving an implied reciprocal easement. 
John B. Huck 
9Finley v. Glenn, note I supra; Ward v. Parks, 166 Ga. 149, 142 S.E. 690 (1928); 
Kirkpatrick v. Peshine, 24 N.J. Eq. 206 (1873). In the last case cited, the principle of 
the Tulk case was strongly endorsed, but could not be applied because, under Glorieux v. 
Lighthipe, note 1 supra, the subsequent grantee could not be charged with constructive 
notice. See also Rosen v. Wolff, 152 Ga. 578, ll0 S.E. 877 (1922); and Langenback v. 
Mays, 207 Ga. 156, 60 S.E. (2d) 240 (1950), where prior tenants enjoined subsequent 
tenants from carrying on a business in breach of the landlord's covenant in prior tenant's 
deed not to rent remaining land to competing concerns. 
10 Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, note 8 supra; McKenrick v. Savings Bank 
of Baltimore, 174 Md. ll8, 197 A. 580 (1938). 
